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1 Frege, Carnap and the contrast between cognitive
semantic sense
In a paper given at the 1997 SILFS Conference, [Pen98] claims that a strong
tension between a semantic and a cognitive notion of sense was already
present in Frege’s writings.
Many authors have discussed recently this tension in Frege, but few of
them remark that Carnap was probably the first to attempt to compose the
tension.
Carnap ([Car47]) soon realized that his conception of intension, although
suitable to treat a semantic notion of sense as truth condition on the lines
developed by Wittgenstein, was not enough to solve the problem posed by
Frege on belief contexts. He devised therefore the notion of intensional
structure and intensional isomorphism, as a more fine-grained notion that
the semantic notion o intension and intensional equivalence. For many
reasons however his notion did not appear successful. In this short paper
we try to develop a new perspective which tries to compose the tension
between a semantic and a cognitive notion of sense, suggesting the use of
proof theory as a mean to interpret the cognitive notion of sense.
In the Fregean view, sense is something which is there to be grasped from
a speaker. The concept of grasping a sense or understanding is co-original
with the notion of sense. However it is not clear in Frege what is the object
of understanding. Frege himself made interesting remarks on the limitations
of understanding complex mathematical formula with all their connections
with other parts of mathematics. In his famous argument on the “intuitive
difference of thought” (as it has been named by Gareth Evans) Frege claims
that if it is possible to understand two sentences, and coherently believe
one and disbelieve the other, then those sentences express different senses
or thoughts. The Fregean example is the belief that Hesperus is a planet and
Phosphorus is not a planet, given by the ignorance of the identity Hespe-
rus=Phosporus. A lack of knowledge permits a person who hold erroneous
beliefs to be considered rational, because the erroneous beliefs express two
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different thoughts, whose truth is not evident to the believer.
The criterion links sense identity to what a subject believes, to her limited
accessibility to the information, to what she grasps, with a limited under-
standing. Here the limitation is given by empirical information, but there
are many passages where Frege accepts the idea of limited computational
capacity as a way to explain why two expressions expresses different senses.
The semantic notion of sense is linked to the criterion of logical equiva-
lence: in an example proposed by Frege (letter to Husserl 1906, see [Fre76].)
two sentences which express a logical equivalence like A→ B and ¬(A∧¬B)
express the same thought. Frege probably connects this idea with the crite-
rion of immediate recognizability, given that most of his examples -given in
his last writings on logic - deal with elementary logical equivalences between
connectives. The idea of sameness of sense given by logical equivalence is
coherent with the concept of sense as truth conditions made by Wittgenstein
in his Tractatus.
The second, semantic notion clashes with the first if we try to apply also
to the semantic notion the criterion of the intuitive difference of thoughts;
if we may believe two sentences as having different truth value because of
lack of information, why shouldn’t we accept the same uncertain attitude
towards two sentences with the same truth conditions, but such that we
accept one of them while remaining uncertain on the truth condition of the
other? Actually we may lack computational capacity, while understanding
the basic notions used, the meaning of the connectives, the working of the
symbolism. We may imagine a person who is so slow that she cannot re-
alize that two logical equivalent sentences produce the same truth tables.
Therefore she may believe that A → B is true while ¬(A ∧ ¬B) is false;
therefore the two sentences would express - contrary to what Frege says -
two different (cognitive) senses. This possibility is enforced by what Frege
says in a later paper on negation, when he assert that A and not not A
express different thoughts.
We claim that the ambiguity in Frege’s concept of sense depends on
the lack of logical instruments that has been developed later with proof
theory. And we think that proof theory may help to define different levels
of understanding; in this way we may distinguish the semantic and the
cognitive aspect of sense, composing the original tension, in a way which is
different from the original suggestions given by Dummett with the choice of
a verificationistic theory of meaning.
2 Understanding sense as truth conditions
Let us begin with an analysis of what it means “to understand sense as
truth conditions”. When we consider complex sentences, the understanding
Sense and Proof 3
of truth conditions amounts to knowing the corresponding truth tables.
The sense of a complex sentence A is then known, when we know for
which values of the atomic propositions occurring in A, the sentence is true.
Consider the example considered above, we have two logically equivalent
sentences (1) A→ B (2) ¬(A ∧ ¬B).
If a subject understands A → B then, by definition of material implica-
tion, she knows that A→ B is true when either A is false or B is true.
If the subject understands ¬(A∧¬B), then she knows that the sentence
is true when it is false that A and B is true; which entails, if the meaning of
the conjunction and the negation is known, that he knows that ¬(A ∧ ¬B)
is true when either A is false or B is true.
So the truth conditions of the sentences involved are the same. If we do
not consider how subjects grasp those truth conditions, then we face the
following problems.
First, for example, we cannot concede the possibility that a subject might
believe (1) true and (2) false. Suppose for example that a subject, by
mistake or logical confusion, believes that A→ B is true and believes that
¬(A ∧ ¬B) is false. Then, she believes that it is the case that A is false or
B is true, since she believes (1) true. But if she believes that ¬(A ∧ ¬B)
is false, then she believes that (A ∧ ¬B) is true; so she believes that A is
true and B is false. Since the information the subject should manage is not
coherent (A is false or B is true, A is true and B is false), the only way in
which we may claim that she believes (1) true and (2) false is claiming that
she is accepting a contradiction. We have no means to say that she doesn’t
realize that she is contradicting. We may however ask whether it is possible
that a subject believes that (1) is true while having no opinion about the
truth value of (2).
Even in this case, if we keep the hypotheses at issue, we cannot represent
such situation. If a subject believes that A → B is true, then she believes
that A is false or B is true, and since these are precisely the truth-conditions
of ¬(A ∧ ¬B) and the subject knows that if these condition are satisfied
then ¬(A∧¬B) is true (since she understands both sentences), then we are
forced to say that the subject believes that (2) is also true. But why does
she believe it? Simply because of our definitions, since we cannot deny it
without contradicting our definitions.
From this argument, it follows that if a subject believes a sentence A,
then he must believe all the sentences that are logically equivalent to A, no
matter how complex they are. Moreover, the subjects immediately believes
all the logically equivalent sentences, since we just proved it as a fact simply
entailed by our hypotheses. With our notion of understanding sense as truth
conditions we are compelled to make our speaker logically omniscient.
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3 A weaker notion of understanding
The logical omniscience of a subject described by the assumptions we made
concerning the notion of understanding a sentence is completely useless from
a cognitive, or computational, point of view.
It seems that if we assume the definition of understanding a sentence as
mere grasping truth conditions, even if we try to employ a cognitive notion of
sense (e. g. the one presented by the immediate recognizability criterion) we
are not allowed to define a cognitive difference between logically equivalent
sentences.
If however we look closer at the same argument we mentioned to find
out the truth conditions of the sentences involved, we note that the formula
¬(A ∧ ¬B) requires more calculation than A→ B.
The notion of sense of a sentences in mere terms of truth conditions fails
to capture all the information concerning the complexity of the process of
grasping the truth condition, which seem to be the relevant aspect in a
cognitive notion of sense.
In the following sections, we will advance a proposal for defining a cog-
nitive notion of sense which is coherent and compatible with an objective
one.
A proper notion of cognitive sense should be grounded not on a strong
notion of understanding requiring full grasping of truth conditions, but on
a weaker notion of understanding based on the idea of limited knowledge
(or even on bounded rationality) 1.
We will therefore need to enrich the notion of sense considering another
aspect of sense that seems more suitable to deal with cognitive aspects,
namely the notion of sense as computing procedure hinted at by Frege (see
[fre93].).
4 Limited knowledge and procedures
Assuming that understanding a formula is not necessarily understanding
directly its truth conditions, but understanding its mode of composition
and the meaning of the connectives, we can state the problem at issue with
the following question:
(Q) Assuming that a subject understands (1) A → B and (2)
¬(A ∧ ¬B), and moreover accepts (1) A → B, what does she
need in order to accept also (2) ¬(A ∧ ¬B)?
The point is that if we aim to describe a cognitive notion of sense, we
cannot consider the process of understanding of the two sentence as imme-
1See [Pen03b]
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diate 2. We need to consider the process of understanding, say (2) given
(1), as a process mediated by a procedure, or a computation. Otherwise
we would lose the information concerning the complexity of the process of
understanding sentences which is essential for a cognitive notion of sense.
Therefore we reformulate the truth conditional approach considering the
procedure of grasping truth conditions as a constitutive feature of under-
standing sentences.
Our basic definition is then that a subject understands a sentence when
she can perform a procedure of grasping truth conditions of the sentence.
A good way to represent procedures, as we shall see in more detail in
the next section, is the notion of proof which may be defined within some
suitable logical calculus. The notion of proof, or more generally the notion
of justification, has been applied for example by Michael Dummett 3 to
define his justification semantics.
However, our proposal is to keep the truth conditional approach – since
it allows to state clearly the relationship between a cognitive notion of sense
and an objective, or semantic, notion of sense – enriching it by means of a
notion of procedure, rather than proposing an alternative semantic theory
based on different key concepts.4 It is useful to remark that the approach
we are suggesting is not to be intended as a representation of the explicit
knowledge speakers have. We are not claiming that it is always the case that
someone who accepts a sentence is able to justify it showing a proof. We are
rather suggesting that the notion of proof is a useful tool for representing
implicit knowledge5 speakers show when they understand sentences.
The problem (Q) therefore may be generally solved in our setting saying
that a subject can understand (1) and (2) since she can manage a procedure
to grasp their truth conditions, but - in case she believes one true and the
other false - she may fail to realize she reaches a contradiction, since the sub-
ject may fail to manage the procedure of detecting the logical relationship
between (1) and (2).
5 Proof theory for representing procedures
We sketch a formal setting for representing the definitions we proposed
which allows us to keep both a classical truth conditional style semantics and
2see [Dum91].
3See [Dum79].
4The justification semantics proposed by Dummett uses the notion of proof as semantic
value, and then it is committed with intuitionistc logic. Here we are presenting an
approach which could be applied in different logical calculi, provided they have a proof
theory and a truth values semantics, since it is not decided yet which formal calculus is
adequate to represent semantic understanding.
5We refer to [Dum91], p. 139.
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to account for the complexity of the procedure of grasping truth conditions.
We propose to use proof theory to represent the procedure of grasping
truth conditions; in this way we can describe the failure of detecting logically
equivalent sentence as a lack of logical competence due to the complexity
of the sentences involved.
Here we will not refer precisely to a particular logical calculus, rather
we will propose some general idea which may be applied in different logical
frameworks6 We consider two notions of sense: a semantic one and a cog-
nitive one. Remark that in this way we may keep a notion of co-tenability
of thoughts, which states some important intuition about the relationship
between the meaning of a sentence and a subject who understands it.
(S) The semantic sense of a sentence A is the whole class of rules defining
a proof of A, which lead to the truth conditions of A.
(C) The cognitive sense of a sentence A is a class of rules a subject man-
ages, which lead to grasp (partial) truth conditions of A.
So the relationship between (C) and (S) can be stated in terms of an
inclusion, namely the cognitive competence of a subject amounts to manage
a subclass of the rules of inference which are defined in a logical calculus.
It is important to remark that the partial understanding we are defining
depends on subjects just in the sense that subjects manage some of the rules
required to build a proof of a given sentence. It doesn’t mean that a subject
has individual or private rules for building proofs7. Moreover, the partial
comprehension can also be stated in terms of complexity bounds on the
application of those rules. For example, if we assume that a subject is able
to perform a modus ponens, we don’t want to assume that he is able to draw
the conclusion at any degree of complexity: we are not assuming she can
6An interesting choice would be to state our definitions within linear logic (see [Gir06]).
Linear logic may be considered more general than intuitionistic or classical logic, in
the sense that both can be embedded in linear logic, and it may also be considered as
an analysis of the properties of classical and intuitionistic proofs. Briefly, linear logic
allows to define where resources are actually needed to be bound and where we can
assume an unbounded number of tokens. This aspect is crucial in order to go into
the relationship between a cognitive and a semantic notion of sense. Moreover, linear
logic has been applied to define formal grammars for natural languages working both
for syntactical aspect of sentence understanding and for composition of meanings (see for
example [Mor94] and [Car97]). However, it is not clear if we can consider the semantics of
linear logic, based on the algebraic structure of phase space (see [Gir87]), as a truth value
semantics: we would need in particular to investigate which notion of truth is formalized
by that structure. We leave a deeper examination of this approach for further work.
7The fact that we don’t allow individual or private strategies aims to keep some
features of the Fregean anti-psychologism: the sense of a sentence doesn’t depend on the
representation nor depends on private aspects of the comprehension of meaning.
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perform a proof consisting in an unbounded iterated or nested applications
of modus ponens. Therefore, the class defining the cognitive notion will be
a sub-class of the class involved in the objective notion of sense.8
We consider some example using natural deduction for classical logic. In
order to get the truth conditions for (1) A → B, a subject may be able to
manage the following procedure, represented by the logical inference:
(pi):
B
A→ B
So the subject knows that she is accepting A→ B, since she is accepting
B.
In this way we may represent a partial comprehension of truth conditions,
in the sense that we do not need to assume subjects are able to grasp all
the possible case described by a truth table (in this example, that A → B
may be true also if A is false). Moreover, in order to get truth conditions
for (2), a subject may be able to perform the following procedure:
(pi′):
¬A
¬(A ∧ ¬B)
Which doesn’t entail a complete knowledge of truth conditions of (2). So
we can assume that a subject can understand (1) and (2) and she can accept
(1) but she can fail to accept (2) simply because she can fail to manage the
procedure of detecting the connection between (1) and (2). Consider again
Frege example. Suppose a subject understands (1) and (2), by means of
the procedures we mentioned. Moreover, she considers (1) true. We can
represent what the subject needs in order to accept also (2), for example by
means of a proof like:
(pi′′):
[A ∧ ¬B]1 ∧ E
A
pi
A→ B → E
B
[A ∧ ¬B]1 ∧ E¬B ¬ E⊥ ¬ I, 1¬(A ∧ ¬B)
8Remark that it is difficult to speak of partial understanding using mere truth-
conditional definition of sense since, as we saw, even if we try to define a partial un-
derstanding by means of the immediate recognizability criterion, we are led either to
make the subject contradict himself or to make the subject logically omniscient.
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Here pi represents the procedure the subject can perform in order to
understand and then accept (1). We used a natural deduction proof just to
show an example, we could have chosen other proof theoretical calculi.9
So we can use the proof pi′′ to represent the process of accepting (2) given
(1). In this way it is possible to argue about complexity bounds to put on
the process itself. Of course our approach should take into account data
describing subjects effective performances.
Consider now an example showing a kind of same level complexity and ask
again the same question concerning what a subject needs in order to detect
logically equivalent sentences. We consider commutative use of conjunction.
May a subject accept A∧B while not accepting B ∧A? If she understands
both sentences, then she grasps in a certain way a procedure represented
by the rules for the conjunction.
If she accepts A ∧ B, then she should accept both A and B. But if this
metalinguistic use of “and” is commutative, then she has to accept also
B ∧ A. In this case, if we are in a commutative framework, we have two
formulas which share a same level of understanding complexity, besides a
common logical content; therefore we may say that a subject who accepts
one of the two sentences is not rational if he doesn’t accept the other, since
she can manage both procedures. 10
We conclude mentioning an example taken from the literature on the ap-
plication of proof theoretical notions in formal semantics which show how
proof theory can represent subjects’ different performances also in case of
quantified sentences11. Consider the problem of quantifier-scope ambiguity.
The sentence “Someone loves everyone” allows two different readings, de-
pending on the narrow (∀∃) or wide (∃∀) scope. A careful examination of
9We can read the proof in the following way. A subject can manage the procedure
pi that leads her to accept (1); in order to accept (2) a proof is required. Assume by
contradiction, A ∧ ¬B. Eliminating conjunction, we obtain A and we obtain ¬B. From
hypothesis (1) and from A, we obtain by eliminating conditional B. But B and ¬B entail
a contradiction (⊥), so we can apply the rule of introducing negation (¬I) and discharge
hypotheses marked by 1. We chose this example, and we used the intuitinonistic rule for
negation, just not to be committed a priori with classical logic. Actually the distinction
between partial and full understanding stated in terms of proof can be reformulated for
semantic theory that insist on other notion of semantic value.
10The aim of this proof theoretic approach to the complexity of understanding meaning
would be a sort of normal form for the proof representing procedures of grasping truth
conditions. Actually we cannot define a normal form procedure without considering
empirical data concerning subjects effective performance. The notion of normalization
of proof, which is a central issue in proof theory, may be a staring point in order to
define classes of meanings sharing a same measure of such complexity, so to give a proof-
theoretical account of the criterion of immediate recognizability.
11See [Mor00].
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proofs representing the meanings of those sentences12 it is possible to ex-
press the fact that the preferred reading (∃∀) has a lower complexity degree
than the other. In this way it is possible to develop a quite precise notion
of cognitive relationship between subject performances and meaning of a
sentence.
Summing up, in case of two logically connected sentences, we can claim
that it is rational, or better it is possible without contradiction, to accept a
sentence while having no opinion concerning the other, when the complexity
of the logically connected sentences is different.
So we provided the theoretical possibility for suspending judgement until,
by reflection, calculation or other means, a subject can access a procedure
for grasping the truth conditions of the sentence.
This approach points at a more sophisticated notion of rationality which
can include the process of learning new procedures (for example, by means
of interaction) rather than considering rationality as static set of features
subjects have, or should have.
6 Conclusion
The proposal we presented allows to consider both a cognitive and a se-
mantic notion of sense and, this is the most interesting point, we can see
how the two notions interact: they are not distinct features, as it happens
for example in many attempts to conciliate those two aspects of Fregean
notion of sense. We stated the relationship between cognitive sense and se-
mantic or objective sense in terms of a partial understanding speakers have
of meaning.
The semantic notion of sense is given by the whole class of procedures, or
proofs, of the given sentence that give the truth conditions of the sentence,
while the cognitive notion of sense is defined as a partial access to semantic
sense. Moreover we used a general notion of procedure, represented by the
notion of proof in some suitable logical system. So it seems that the oppo-
sition between a truth-conditional semantics and a justification-semantics
(Dummett) may be weakened considering the proof as a way to grasp truth
conditions of a given sentence.
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